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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This appeal is from the Order of Kenneth Rigtrup, one
of the judges of the Third Judicial District Court, refusing to
modify a stipulated Decree of Divorce in regard to terminating
child support at age 21 on the grounds that once the parties had
entered into an agreement which merged into the Decree, the
Decree could not be modified.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The appellant filed a motion to modify the Decree of
Divorce which required him to pay child support for his children
so long as they were full-time students residing with the appellant.

The motion was based on decisions of this Court published

after the entry of the Decree which established that he could not
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be required to provide a college education for his children or to
pay support beyond their 21st birthdays absent special circumstances justifying such an order.

His motion was premised on the

argument that changes in the law after the entry of the Decree
constituted a change of circumstances justifying modification of
the Decree.

He proposed to support the children through the age

of 21 while they were full-time students residing with respondent
but to terminate support at age 21.

The trial court ruled that

since he had agreed to support the children so long as they
resided with respondent and remained in school, the Decree could
not be modified.
Appellant appeals from that Order.

NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the trial court's Order
Denying Modification of the Decree and either an order modifying
the Decree to terminate the obligation to support his children
upon their 21st birthday, or, in the alternative, a reversal of
the trial court's ruling and a remand to the trial court for
determination of whether, in view of the change of law enunciated
in the decisions of this Court, and the fact that neither of the
minor children of the parties to which the child provisions of
the Decree apply suffer any disability which would require
support beyond their 21st birthdays, the Decree should be modified
-2Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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to terminate the appellant's child support obligation upon the
attainment of the age of 21 of each of said children.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent initially filed a complaint for divorce in
this matter on November 15, 1973 (Record 2-7).

Three years

thereafter, November 24, 1976, the parties filed with the court a
property settlement agreement which provided for resolution of
all of the matters in issue.

(Record 94-98).

Paragraph III of

that agreement provided:
That defendant agrees to pay the plaintiff the
sum of $1,500.00 per month as alimony and child
support, said $1,500.00 being $500.00 per month
alimony and $500.00 per month for each child
as child support until that child reaches his
or her majority. The alimony payments shall last
for a period of ten years from the date of
Decree of Divorce is entered.
(Record 95).
and the relevant portion of Paragraph IV provided:
That de~endant additionally agrees that if either
minor child desires to continue his or her education after graduation from high school, then
the child support shall be paid to the plaintiff
for the support of that child so long as that
child resides in the home of and with the plaintiff and so long as that child is a fulltime
student.
(Record 95).
The settlement agreement was presented to and accepted
by the trial court.

The two terms of the stipulation set out

above were incorporated as Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Findings of

-3-
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Fact (Record 102) and paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Decree of Divorce
(Record 105) which was made and entered on November 24, 1976.
·After the entry of the Decree of Divorce, this Court
rendered a series of decisions, discussed infra, which established that a parent could not, absent special circumstances
justifying such a requirement, be ordered to pay for the college
education of his or her children, be required to support his or
her children between the ages of 18 and 21 and be required to
support a child beyond the age of 21.
Appellant determined, based on these decisions, to seek
modification of the Decree as Susan, the older of the two children covered by the Decree, approached her 21st birthday.

He

sought to terminate the requirement that he continue to pay
$500.00 per month as child support for her while Susan and her
brother resided with respondent and remained as full-time students after they attained their 21st birthdays.

(Record 276-277,

295).

Susan is a full-time student and resides with the respon-

dent.

(Record 252-253).

Eric is still a minor.

(Record 102).

Appellant agreed to pay support for the two children
until their 21st birthdays if they reside with respondent and are
full-time students, but seeks to have the child support terminate
for each child on that child's 21st birthday.

(Record 276-277,

2 95) .

-4-
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ARGUMENT
A CHANGE IN THE LAW CONSTITUTES CHANGE OF
CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFYING THE MODIFICATION
OF A DECREE OF DIVORCE
A change of law which has a significant impact upon a
Decree of Divorce is a change of circumstances which this Court
should rule requires a trial court to re-examine a Decree of
Divorce entered before the change to see if the change produced
a result which justifies modification of the Decree.

In the

instant matter, the trial court refused to even consider doing
so stating:
My ruling is that I am simply approving the
Decree which recognized that he agreed as a
matter of contract. A deal is a deal. The
bottom line is that a deal is a deal.
(Record 295}.
Judge Rigtrup rejected, without consideration, the argument
that a change of law is a basis upon which a Decree of Divorce
entered pursuant to the agreement of the parties, may be modified.
That is an error which requires reversal by this Court.
In the instant matter, between the entry of the
Decree of Divorce and appellant's motion to modify the Decree,
a series of decisions by this Court established a substantial
change in the law which require a re-examination of the Decree.
In English v. English, 565 P.2d 409 (Utah 1977}; Carlson v.
Carlson, 584 P.2d 864 (Utah 1978}; and Harris v. Harris, 585
-5-
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P.2d 435 (Utah 1978), this Court established that a parent,
absent special circumstances [such as those set out in Dehn v.
Dehn, 545 P.2d 525 (Utah 1976)], has no duty to support his
children beyond the age of 18.
From the wording of that statute, it could
hardly be made plainer that the authority
to extend the obligation of a parent to
support his child beyond the age of 18 is
discretionary. We see this as a wise and
proper legislative recognition of the fact
that though children attain their majority
and thus become emancipated at 18, there may
nevertheless be unusual circumstances where
the Court would be justified in placing an
additional burden on parents. However, it
is to be kept in mind that any discretionary
power is not absolute, but must be
exercised with reason and good conscience
upon the foundation of facts so justifying.
(emphasis added).
Carlson v. Carlson, 584 P.2d at 856.
In that same year it was ruled that trial courts do
not have the power to require a parent to pay for the college
education of a child in the absence of compelling special
circumstances, Ferguson v. Ferguson, 578 P.2d 1274 (Utah 1978).
Based on those rulings, appellant determined that he
should return to the court for modification of the Decree as
Susan, the older of the two children covered by the Decree,
approached her 21st birthday.

He sought a modification of the

Decree to terminate his obligation to pay $500.00 per month as
child support when Susan attained her 21st birthday in September
of 1980.

He asserted the change or articulation of the law as
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thus enunciated, constituted a change of circumstances which
required the District Court to modify the Decree in this case.
While this matter was pending, this Court opined in
two cases which make clear the error of the trial court.

In

Chandler v. West, 610 P.2d 1299 (Utah 1980), it was stated:
Land v. Land, Utah, 605 P.2d 1248 (1980),
held that property settlements are entitled
to greater sanctity than alimony and support
payments in proceedings to modify divorce
decrees. However, property settlements are
not sacrocanct and are not beyond the power
of a court of equity to modify.
610 P.2d at 1300.

It is thus clear that the sununary action of

the trial court based on "a deal is a deal" (Record 291-292) is
a rejection of the rule articulated by this Court that even

stipulated Decrees are to be re-examined when circumstances
change.
Appellant asks this Court to reverse the trial court
because it summarily rejected his assertion that a change in
the law is a change in circumstances which justifies re-examination of the Decree of Divorce.

There is no question of fact

in the instant matter; it is a question of a change in the law.
It is on this basis that the appellant has pursued this appeal.
In the second decision, Kerr v. Kerr,

---,

P.2d

Utah, 1980, this Court ruled:
Defendant next complains of the requirement
that he pay $450.00 per month for the support
of his 15-year old son, Stephen, as long as he
continues to reside with the plaintiff and is
-7Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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attending college fulltime or serving a
mission for his church. This objection is
well taken.
u.c.A., 1953, 15-2-1, as amended,
provides that minors attain their majority at
age 18 unless sooner married, but that courts
in divorce actions may order support to age
21. The Decree here did not limit the support
to age 21 and more seriously was not based
upon any finding of circumstances which would
justify the order compelling the defendant to
support his son beyond the age of 18. We held
in Carlson v. Carlson, Utah, 584 P.2d 864
(1978) that in the absence of such a finding,
an order of support for a child over 18 cannot
stand. We appreciate that since Stephen's
18th birthday was, at the time of trial, more
than three years in the future, the court
could not know and therefore, could not find
what his specific needs would be at age 18.
We therefore modify the Decree to provide for
the payment of child support until his 18th
birthday at which time if support is still
needed, the plaintiff may petition for a
continuation of support based upon the circumstances existing at that time.
P.2d at
slip opinion at 3-4.
This is precisely the question raised by appellant in the instant
matter.

The sole difference between the question raised by

appellant and Kerr v. Kerr, supra, is the fact that appellant
initially agreed to accept this condition and only when subsequent changes in or articulation of the law occurred, did he
return to the court for a re-evaluation of the Decree -- precisely
what this Court told the respondent to do in Kerr v. Kerr,
supra.
In contrast to Kerr v. Kerr, the agreement between the
instant parties was negotiated prior to the rules applied in
Kerr v. Kerr, supra, being articulated by this Court.

Until the
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law was enunciated, appellant did not know the provisions of the
Decree exceeded the authority of the trial court.

Now, his

daughter is approaching age 21 and he is required to pay $500.00
per month in perpetuity while she lives with respondent and
attends school.

His son can follow the same course.

He sought a

ruling from the court that his obligation to pay child support
should terminate when his daughter reaches age 21.

Neither of

his children suffer any disability nor is there any other factor
which would justify continuation of support beyond their 18th
birthdays, but he has accepted that pursuant to his agreement,
support should continue to age 21.

(Record 295).

The District Court sununarily overruled his motion.

If

the District Court ruling is correct, it would establish a principle directly contrary to the overall policy of the law to
encourage settlements.

If, as in Kerr v. Kerr, supra, a case

goes to trial and a party is ordered to do something that he
could not legally be required to do, he may appeal or seek to
modify the order.

Under the trial court's ruling in the instant

matter, however, once he entered into an agreement and the law
was thereafter modified, this relief would be denied to him.
Such a ruling would not only discourage entering a settlement, it
could serve to make an attorney guilty of malpractice were he to
advise or concur in his client's entering a settlement which
contained terms which a court later determined invalid.

The

-9-
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attorney would have to insist on trial or risk a malpractice
action if, following the proffered advice, the client agreed to a
settlement, then learned he was barred from seeking a modification of the Decree while he could ·have done so had he gone to
trial.
The errors in the trial court's ruling are manifest and
require this Court to reverse the decision and order.

CONCLUSION
This Court must reverse the trial court and rule that
when there is a change in the law that has a significant impact
on the provisions of the Decree of Divorce, including a Decree of
Divorce entered pursuant to stipulation of the parties, it constitutes a change of circumstances requiring a District Court to
examine the provisions of the Decree and determine if the change
in law does require a modification of the Decree.

In the instant

matter, this Court should determine that it does and rule that
the obligation of the appellant to support his children in the
sum of $500.00 per month so long as they are full-time students
and reside with the respondent, terminates when each of the said
children attains the age of 21.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

:2>9

day of July, 1980.
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